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Abstract. Whilst the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which 
became part of binding primary EU law on 1 December 2009, constitutes an important 
codification and clarification of fundamental rights as they exist in the European Union, 
the field of application of the Charter is limited in a significant way: the Charter only 
applies when EU law is at stake. When national courts and authorities in the EU Member 
States are confronted with problems of purely national law, they are not obliged to apply the 
Charter but should instead rely on the national constitutional Bill of Rights as well as the 
international human rights instruments which are binding on the Member State in question. 
The borderline between EU law and national law is not always easy to establish in a concrete 
case. This article discusses theoretical and practical problems arising out of the application and 
interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter, according to which the Charter is addressed to 
the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. It is suggested to adopt a 
pragmatic case-by-case approach, asking oneself if there is another norm of Union law than a 
Charter provision which is directly relevant to a case in concreto. If the answer is yes, also the 
Charter should be applied, supposing that there is a Charter provision which could influence 
the outcome of the case. If the answer is in the negative, national courts and authorities 
are only obliged to apply national law, including the constitutional Bill of Rights and the 
international human rights obligations of the Member State concerned.
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Introduction
One of the sticking-points in the negotiations on the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union1 was the question of its applicability at national level. According to 
Article 51(1) of the Charter, whilst its provisions are addressed to the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union, they are also addressed to the Member States but then 
‘only when they are implementing Union law’ (emphasis added). This formulation has 
already provoked a great deal of discussion and also controversy. Without analysing the 
already rich literature on this subject in any depth or detail,2 the following contribution 
will suggest a way of looking at the field of application of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the national context which may help to somewhat de-dramatise the question 
and also show that the real problem is not so much the applicability of the Charter as 
such but rather the applicability of another norm of Union law. Before entering into this 
specific question concerning the applicability of the Charter and EU fundamental rights 
more generally, I shall sketch out the main developments leading up to the adoption and 
entry into force of the Charter.
As is well known, the introduction of a fundamental rights regime into EU law is 
essentially a story of judge-made law.3 In 1969, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
recognised the importance of fundamental rights by holding that they form part of the 
1 The Charter was first proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission as an 
instrument of soft law, [2000] OJ C364/1. Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, refers to a slightly modified version (‘as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 
December 2007’), reprinted in [2010] OJ C83/389, and makes it clear that the adapted Charter ‘shall have 
the same legal value as the Treaties’, in other words, have the status of Union primary law.
2 By way of example, reference can be made to Rosas, A.; Armati, L. EU Constitutional Law: An 
Introduction. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 147−151; Rosas, A.; Armati, L. EU Constitutional 
Law: An Introduction. 2nd rev edn. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 164−168 (forthcoming); Rosas, A.; 
Kaila, H. L’application de la Charte des droits fondamentaux par la Cour de justice: un premier bilan. Il 
diritto dell’Unione Europea. 2011, XVI: 19−20; Ladenburger, C. European Union Institutional Report. 
In: Laffranque, J. (ed.) The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon, Reports of the XXV FIDE 
Congress Tallinn 2012. Vol 1. Tallinn: Tartu University Press, 2012, p. 159−173; von Danwitz, T.; 
Paraschas, K. A Fresh Start for the Charter: Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Fordham International Law Journal. 2012, 35: 1403−1413; Kaila, H. 
The Scope of Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the Member 
States. In: Cardonnel, P.; Rosas, A.; Wahl, N. (eds.) Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in 
Honour of Pernilla Lindh. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012 (forthcoming). 
3 The foremost architect of this development was P. Pescatore, see his ‘Les droits de l’homme et l’intégration 
européenne’. Cahiers de droit européen. 1968, 4: 629. See also Rosas, A. The European Court of Justice 
and Fundamental Rights: Yet Another Case of Judicial Activism? In: Baudenbacher, C.; Bull, H. (eds.) 
European Integration Through Interaction of Legal Regimes. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2007, p. 33.
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general principles of Community law whose observance the Court ensures.4 Some 
landmark judgments of the early 1970s developed and refined this approach.5 
Later developments include political declarations made by the then Community 
institutions and the gradual insertion of fundamental rights and human rights clauses 
in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC).6 Especially through the further development and refinement of ECJ 
case law, there has also been a gradual rapprochement between Union law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, although the EU is not directly bound by the 
Convention as a Contracting Party.7 Moreover, Article 6(2) TEU, as amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon (which entered into force on 1 December 2009), provides that the 
Union ‘shall accede’ to the European Convention (although at the time of writing (July 
2012), it is still an open question when, and under what precise modalities, the EU could 
become a Contracting Party).8 
Despite these developments in case law as well as Treaty law, it was felt that the 
EU fundamental rights regime was in need of a single and authoritative document listing 
the main fundamental rights the EU holds dear, so that authorities and citizens would 
have at their disposal a true Bill of Rights instead of having to search through thousands 
of pages of court decisions and a variety of legal and political texts. In December 2000, 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission solemnly proclaimed the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.9 
The Treaty of Lisbon not only makes the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union a legally binding document but also endows it with the status of Union 
primary law. According to Article 6(1) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Charter ‘shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. It is noteworthy that Article 
6(1) TEU also provides that the Charter shall be interpreted ‘with due regard’ to the 
Explanations which were drawn up as a way of providing guidance in its interpretation.10 
4 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419.
5 See, in particular, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125; Case 4/73 Nold 
[1974] ECR 491.
6 See the preamble of the Single European Act of 1987 and Art. F of the TEU (later to become Art. 6 TEU), 
established by the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. 
7 Since the mid-1970s, the ECJ has referred to provisions of the European Convention as an authoritative 
guideline for determining the content of fundamental rights as general principles of Community law. The 
Court later determined that the European Convention enjoys ‘special significance’ and also began to cite 
individual judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in its case law. See generally Rosas, A. 
Fundamental Rights in the Case-Law of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts. In: Baudenbacher, C., et 
al (eds.) The EFTA Court: Ten Years On. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 163.
8 See, Rosas, A.; Armati, L. (2012), supra note 2, p. 170−171. 
9 See supra note 1.
10 These Explanations were originally prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention 
which drafted the Charter of 2000. They were later updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium of 
the Europan Convention which drafted the abortive Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which 
was signed in October 2004 but never entered into force, [2004] OJ C310/1. The Explanations have been 
published as an annex to the Charter as adapted in 2007, [2007] OJ C303/717. See, e.g. Case C-279/09 
DEB, judgment of 22 December 2010 nyr, para 32. See also Ziller, J. Le fabuleux destin des Explications 
relatives à la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. In: Chemins d’Europe: Mélanges en 
l’honneur de Jean Paul Jacqué. Paris: Dalloz, 2010, p. 765.
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The Charter builds upon the European Convention on Human Rights, the European 
Social Charter and other human rights conventions as well as the constitutional traditions 
common to the EU Member States. Some of the provisions constitute refinements or 
even developments of existing human rights instruments. Examples include an absolute 
prohibition of the death penalty (Article 2), a prohibition on the reproductive cloning of 
human beings (Article 3) and a prohibition of discrimination on ‘new’ grounds such as 
disability, age and sexual orientation (Article 21). 
Finally, it should be noted that Article 6(3) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, preserves the idea, expressed in the case law of the ECJ since 1969, that 
fundamental rights constitute general principles of Union law. This arguably will mean 
that the rather open-ended list of sources of inspiration which the Court has relied upon 
to ‘find’ the general principles of Union law, including other human rights conventions 
than the European Convention,11 as well as the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, will not lose its relevance altogether. On the other hand, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights will arguably be much more important in guiding both the Union 
legislator and the EU Courts.12
1. EU Fundamental Rights at National Level: General  
Considerations
As an important component of Union primary law, fundamental rights are, in 
principle, always applicable when Union institutions and other bodies act and that is 
why Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states that the provisions of 
the Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the Union. 
The question of application of Union fundamental rights at Member States’ level has 
caused more discussion and concerns. When should national courts and authorities apply 
the Charter, and Union fundamental rights in general, rather than fundamental rights 
recognised in the national constitution and in international human rights instruments 
binding on the Member State in question? 
11 On these sources see Rosas, A. The European Union and International Human Rights Instruments. In: 
Kronenberger, V. (ed.) The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? 
The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001, p. 53; Rosas, A. International Human Rights Instruments in the 
Case-Law of the European Court of Justice. In: Law in the Changing Europe: Liber Amicorum Pranas 
Kūris. Vilnius: Mykolas Romeris University, 2008, p. 363; Rosas, A. The European Union: In Search of 
Legitimacy. In: Jaichand, V.; Suksi, M. (eds.) 60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
Europe. Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009, p. 415.
12 The term ‘Union Courts’ refers, apart from the ECJ, to the General Court (previously the Court of First 
Instance) and the EU Civil Service Tribunal, which are all seated in Luxembourg. Here, the term does not 
refer to national courts of the EU Member States, although they may be viewed as EU courts in the large 
sense or at least as courts which are part of the EU judicial system (see at supra note 16 below).
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As there is a great deal of common ground between the national Bills of Right, the 
international human rights instruments and the Charter,13 we should not, as far as the 
substance is concerned, overemphasize the importance of this question. In many cases, 
the result will be more or less the same, regardless of which specific text, the national 
Constitution, an international convention or the Charter, is applied to a given case. That 
said, the national constitutional Bills of Rights are far from identical, which seems to 
explain why the ECJ has not very often referred to the ‘constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States’ as a guideline for determining the fundamental rights which 
should be recognised as general principles of Union law.14 Nor do the national Bills of 
Rights simply reproduce the relevant international conventions. Moreover, the Charter, 
as noted above, also contains some new fundamental rights which are not necessarily 
to be found in the European Convention on Human Rights or other international human 
rights instruments or in national constitutional Bills of Rights. From a substantive point 
of view, it may thus matter whether one applies EU fundamental rights or national law. 
There is also the question of competence: if the reach of EU fundamental rights at 
the national level is very wide, the scope of application of the national Bill of Rights 
becomes more limited, supposing that EU law on this point, too, enjoys primacy over 
national law, including the national constitution.15 That the question of competence is a 
sensitive one is obvious already from the wording of both Article 6(1) TEU and Article 
51(2) of the Charter, which are at pains to stress that the provisions of the Charter are 
not intended to extend the competences and powers of the Union. 
On the other hand, it should go almost without saying that Union fundamental rights 
have to be respected at the national level when Union law is applied. This is simply a 
function of the fact that fundamental rights are part of Union primary law and must, 
like any norm of Union law, be respected when this body of law is applied by courts or 
authorities, be they Union Courts or the courts and tribunals of the Member States. It 
should be recalled that Union law is implemented and applied primarily at the national 
level and that the national courts are important parts of the EU judicial system.16 Article 
19(1) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, reminds us of the role of national 
courts and remedies by instructing the Member States to ‘provide remedies sufficient to 
ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’. The principle of 
effective judicial protection (but without being limited to the national judicial system) is 
recognised in somewhat greater detail in Article 47 of the Charter (‘Right to an effective 
13 See also the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, according to which the Charter ‘reaffirms’ 
the rights ‘as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations 
common to the Member States, the [European Convention on Human Rights], the Social Charters adopted 
by the Union and the Council of Europe and the case-law of the [ECJ] and of the European Court of 
Human Rights’. See also Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, para 38, which refers 
to this part of the Preamble to the Charter.
14 Rosas, A.; Armati, L. (2012), supra note 2, p. 168.
15 Ibid., p. 67−70.
16 Rosas, A. The National Judge as EU Judge: Opinion 1/09. In: Cardonnel, P.; Rosas, A.; Wahl, N., supra 
note 2. See also Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011 Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents 
Court nyr.
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remedy and to a fair trial’). As to the national judicial system in particular, Article 267 
TFEU relating to references from national courts for preliminary rulings by the ECJ 
provides a long-standing and well-established mechanism which highlights the role of 
the national judge as the EU judge.17
2. ECJ Case Law Predating the Charter of Fundamental Rights
In the light of the above, it should not have come as a surprise to anyone when the 
ECJ, in Wachauf, confirmed that Union fundamental rights ‘are also binding on the 
Member States when they implement Community rules’.18 In ERT and subsequently, the 
test was formulated as a requirement that the national measures ‘fall within the scope of 
Community law’.19 Contrary to what some of the discussions at the Convention which 
prepared the Charter of Fundamental Rights appeared to assume,20 the Court did not 
launch any radical new principle in these judgments but simply stated the obvious.
That said, it has not always been easy to draw the line separating those national 
rules that fall within the scope of Union law from those falling outside that scope. In 
some cases, the ECJ has concluded that the link between the national measures and 
Union law was not sufficiently direct or strong and that the national measure thus fell 
outside the scope of Union law (perhaps the most well-known case concerned a prisoner 
who attempted to invoke his Union law right to move and reside freely as a basis for 
contesting his prison sentence).21 A number of examples best illustrate the issues that 
can arise. 
In Carpenter, a Union citizen who provided services to recipients in other Member 
States as ‘a significant proportion of his business’ could, invoking the freedom to provide 
services under Union law, rely on his right to family life in order to oppose the expulsion 
of his spouse, a third-country national, from his Member State of origin, despite the fact 
that the spouse had not travelled with her husband to the other Member States concerned 
and so had not herself exercised free movement rights.22
 In KB, the Court held that the refusal to grant a widower’s pension to a couple 
on the basis that they were not married came in principle within the purview of Union 
law. The couple in question were not married as a result of the refusal under national 
law to recognise that gender reassignment could result in the classification of a couple 
as heterosexual (a condition for marriage). While the right to marry was a question for 
17 See, e.g. Naomé, C. Le renvoi préjudiciel en droit européen: Guide pratique. 2nd edn. Bruxelles: Éditions 
Larcier, 2010.
18 Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2607, para 19. See also Case 36/75 Rutili [1995] ECR, 1219; Case 63/83 
Kent Kirk [1984] ECR 2689; Case 249/86 Commission v. Germany [1989] ECR 1263.
19 Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi (ERT) [1991] ECR I-2925. See also Case C-159/90 
Grogan [1991] ECR I-4605, para. 31.
20 See at supra notes 28-29 below.
21 Case C-299/95 Kremzov [1997] ECR I-2405. See also Case C-159/90 Grogan, supra note 19; Case 
C-306/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR I-7493.
22 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, paras 37–40.
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national law, the case at hand concerned inequality of treatment as regards a necessary 
precondition for the grant of a pension, a matter of Union law. As this inequality of 
treatment resulted from a breach of the right to marry under Article 12 of the ECHR, the 
national legislation at issue was to be regarded as being, in principle, incompatible with 
the requirements of Article 141 EC (Article 157 TFEU) on equal pay.23
In Karner, the ECJ was faced with the question as to whether certain advertising 
restrictions were compatible with the then Article 28 TEC on the free movement of 
goods. The Court held that the restrictions in question constituted selling arrangements 
which thus, in view of its Keck case law, could escape the prohibition laid down in Article 
28.24 The Court then went on to examine whether the selling arrangement fulfilled the 
conditions laid down in the Keck judgment, that is, that it did not discriminate between 
domestic and other traders and products. After having decided that there was no such 
discrimination the Court examined whether the advertising restrictions could also be 
seen as a provision of services (concluding in the negative, as the service element was 
seen as secondary in relation to the free movement of goods) and whether they posed 
a problem from the point of view of freedom of expression (this was held not to be 
the case). The Court thus examined a fundamental rights argument in a way which 
seemed to add to the conditions of Keck the requirement that the selling arrangements in 
question were not in contravention of EU fundamental rights.
In Mangold and Kücükdeveci, the Court, taking inspiration inter alia from Directive 
2000/78 (mentioned above), concluded that non-discrimination on grounds of age had 
become a general principle of Union law.25 However, in Mangold the deadline for 
the implementation of the Directive had not yet expired, and the Directive could not 
therefore be invoked to bring the matter within the scope of Union law. The Court 
relied instead on the fact that the national legislation at issue also constituted a measure 
implementing another directive.26
While these and other cases suggest a fairly wide conception of what measures 
fall within the scope of Union law, it should be emphasised that the Union Courts have 
not considered themselves as human rights courts with general jurisdiction over the 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights and other international 
human rights instruments. They have applied and interpreted fundamental rights in the 
context of their normal day-to-day activities relating to all substantive areas of Union 
23 Case C-117/01 KB [2004] ECR I-541, paras 30–34. In the case of Goodwin v UK and I v UK, judgment 
of 11 July 2002, the European Court of Human Rights had held that the fact that it was impossible for a 
transsexual to marry a person of the sex to which he or she had belonged prior to gender reassignment was 
a breach of the right to marry.
24 Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025.
25 Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981; Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365. In Kücük-
deveci, the problem did not arise in the same way as the deadline for the implementation of Directive 
2000/78 had expired. These two cases also raise the question of horizontal application of Union funda-
mental rights. On this question see Rosas, A.; Armati, L. (2012), supra note 2, p. 179−180.
26 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed term work 
concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, [1999] OJ L175/43. See Case C-144/04 Mangold, supra note 24, 
para 75.
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law and in the context of the normal procedural remedies available, including actions for 
annulment (Article 263 TFEU) and preliminary ruling procedures (Article 267 TFEU).
3. The Lisbon Treaty and the Charter
The Lisbon Treaty, although it did make the Charter of Fundamental Rights a part 
of Union primary law, did not fundamentally alter the status of fundamental rights in 
the EU constitutional order. The EU did not become a human rights organisation, with 
a human rights competence detached from the competences conferred upon the Union 
in the basic Treaties. Nor did the Union Courts not become human rights courts, with 
jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights matters regardless of the limitations imposed 
by Union law.27 This reality, in accordance with what was already said above, is 
reflected notably in Article 6(1) TEU, which provides that the provisions of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights ‘shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union 
as defined in the Treaties’, and in Article 51 of the Charter, which provides that its 
provisions are addressed to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union 
law’ and that the Charter ‘does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond 
the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify 
powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties’. 
 In the Convention which drafted the Charter, discussions on the application 
of fundamental rights at national level were not without difficulties.28 The United 
Kingdom, in particular, resisted the application of the Charter at national level and, 
having failed in this objective, instead obtained inclusion of a separate Protocol relating 
to the application of the Charter to the United Kingdom. Poland joined this bandwagon 
and so Protocol No 30 annexed to the TEU and TFEU concerns the application of the 
Charter to both of these Member States.29
As Article 51(1) of the Charter refers to a situation of ‘implementing’ Union law, 
there has been much discussion on whether this expression is more restrictive than 
the ‘scope’ or ‘field of application’ of Union law. In the Explanations relating to the 
Charter, reference is made both to the case law of the ECJ stating that the requirement to 
respect fundamental rights is binding on the Member States ‘when they act in the scope 
of Union law’ and to cases using the notion of ‘implementation’.30 In any event, the 
27 Rosas, A. Is the EU a Human Rights Organisation? CLEER Working Papers 2011/1. The Hague: T.M.C 
Asser Institute, 2011. 
28 See, e.g. de Búrca, G. The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. European 
Law Review. 2001, 26: 126, 136; Eeckhout, P. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal 
Question. Common Market Law Review. 2002, 39: 945, 954. 
29 Protocol (No 30) on the Application of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union to 
Poland and to the United Kingdom annexed to the TEU and the TFEU. See also Joined Cases C-411/10 
and C-493/10 N.S. and M.E., judgment of 21 December 2011 nyr, paras 116−122. It has been agreed at the 
political level that in the context of the next accession agreement (Croatia), the Czech Republic would be 
allowed to join Protocol No 30, Rosas, A.; Armati, L. (2012), supra note 2, p. 174.
30 As was noted in note 10 above, these Explanations were originally prepared under the authority of the 
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reference to implementation was not meant to exclude situations where Member States 
apply Union legal norms directly, including situations where they invoke derogations 
from such norms, in other words including situation where there is no separate national 
implementing act.31 
It would in fact be quite extraordinary to apply a given norm ‘at the Union level’ 
(whatever that means) with due regard also to the Charter of Fundamental Rights whilst 
applying it directly at the national level without such regard. Such a constellation could 
lead to different interpretations of the same norm, depending on the level that it was 
applied, or to finding that the norm is valid when applied at one level but invalid when 
applied at the other. This again would run counter to the principle of uniform application 
and interpretation of Union law.
4. The Meaning of ‘Implementing’ Union Law in Article 51(1)
‘Implementing’ thus cannot be given such a narrow reading that only some instances 
of the application of Union law are covered. It should also be observed that all the 
language versions of Article 51(11) of the Charter do not use the verb ‘implement’ (in 
French ‘mise en oeuvre’) but the verb ‘apply’ (for instance, in Finnish ‘soveltaa’ and 
in Swedish ‘tillämpa’). It should also be recalled that the earlier case-law of the ECJ as 
well as the Explanations relating to the Charter refer to both ‘implementing’ Union law 
and acting within ‘the scope of’ Union law.
That said, it should be clear from the above that invoking a Charter provision will 
not suffice to convert a situation otherwise regulated by national law to one covered 
by Union law.32 The Charter is only applicable if the case concerns not only a Charter 
provision but also another norm of Union law. There must be a provision or a principle 
of Union primary or secondary law that is directly relevant to the case.
This, in fact, is the first conclusion to draw: the problem does not primarily concern 
the applicability of the Charter in its own right but rather the relevance of other Union 
law norms. To come back to the examples from case law already preceding the entry 
into force of the Charter,33 the relevant EU norms concerned, in Carpenter, the freedom 
to provide services, in KB the principle of equal pay for men and women, in Karner the 
free movement of goods and, in this context, the Keck principle and in Mangold and 
Kücükdeveci, certain EU Directives that had been implemented at national level. If the 
Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter and were later updated under the responsibility 
of the Praesidium of the European Convention which drafted the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. It should 
also be recalled that according to Article 6(1) TEU, the Charter shall be interpreted ‘with due regard to the 
explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions’. 
31 See, in particular, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and M.E., supra note 29, nyr, paras 64–69, 
which concerned the application of a provision of a regulation at national level. See also Eeckhout, P., 
supra note 28, p. 977–79; Ladenburger, C. L’application pratique de la Charte des droits fondamentaux 
par la Commission européenne. Revue européenne de droit public. 2002, 14: 817, 828.
32 Rosas, A.; Armati, L. (2012), supra note 2, p. 167−168.
33 See at section 3 above.
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EU Courts consider that they are called upon to apply and, as the case may be, interpret 
such norms, they cannot leave the Charter, or EU fundamental rights more generally, 
outside the equation.
This is not to say that it is always easy to decide whether an EU norm is sufficiently 
relevant to a case and require, if need be, an intervention by a Union Court. But this 
is an old problem which may also arise in situations where fundamental rights are not 
at issue. Should, for instance, the ECJ reply to a question concerning the validity or 
interpretation of an EU legal norm if there are doubts about the relevance of the answer 
for the litigation before the national court, including situations where the national court 
cannot apply the EU norm directly but requests a reply in view of the fact that a Union 
law interpretation could or would be relevant for the interpretation of a norm of national 
law in view of the fact that there is a specific link (such as an express reference) between 
the relevant national and Union norms.34 It is obvious that the Court has a certain margin 
of appreciation as to whether to reply or not to such questions but this is a well-known 
problem which is not limited to the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
If the Court decides to give an answer on the interpretation of a Union norm (other 
than a provision of the Charter or a fundamental right as a general principle of Union 
law), it is evident that the Charter should be taken into account as well to the extent that 
one or more of its provisions are of relevance for this interpretation. A fortiori, this also 
applies to the question as to whether a Union norm is valid in view of the Charter.35 It 
would seem that it is situations of application rather than interpretation which cause 
bigger problems of demarcation. This includes the question as to whether a Union norm 
is applicable – or to put it differently, sufficiently relevant for the outcome of a case – in 
order to open the door for an application of Charter provisions as well.  
To take an example from free movement rights, in Kremzov the ECJ held that a 
prison sentence based exclusively on national law did not constitute such a hindrance to 
the prisoner’s right to free movement that the situation was caught by the then Article 
8a TEC (now Article 21 TFEU), or to cite the Court, that the situation did not ‘establish 
a sufficient connection with Community law to justify the application of Community 
provisions’.36  Contrast this outcome with Carpenter, who provided services to 
recipients in other Member States as ‘a significant proportion of his business’. As the 
Union legislator itself had in many ways recognised the importance of ensuring the 
protection of family life in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of fundamental 
Treaty freedoms, the decision to deport his wife, a third-country national, from the 
United Kingdom would, despite the fact that the spouse had not travelled with her 
34 I am, of course, thinking about the Dzodzi case law, where the ECJ has accepted to interpret a Union 
norm in a purely national situation if national law makes a reference to this norm, see, e.g., Naomé, C., 
supra note 17, p. 124−125. For an example of a recent case see Case C-482/2010 Cicala, judgment of 21 
December 2011.
35 In two recent cases, the ECJ has considered Union norms as invalid in view of the Charter, Case C-92/09 
Volker and Schecke, judgment of 9 November 2010 nyr (Article 7 of the Charter on respect for private and 
family life and Article 8 on the protection of personal data); Case C-236/09 Test-Achats, judgment of 1 
March 2011 nyr (Article 23 on equality between men and women).
36 Case C-299/95, supra note 21, para 16.
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husband to the other Member States concerned and so had not herself exercised free 
movement rights, ‘be detrimental to their family life and, therefore, the conditions under 
which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom’.37 
What is common to both cases is that what was primarily at issue was the applicability 
of a provision of Union law other than a fundamental right (free movement of Union 
citizens and the right to provide services, respectively) rather than of a fundamental right 
as such. What distinguishes these two cases is that family life was considered important 
for the exercise of free movement rights whereas the latter were not intended to protect 
persons against penal sanctions for crimes that were unrelated to free movement.   
Despite a significant broadening of the field of application of Union law as a result 
of the evolving nature of Union citizenship, the fact that a situation may, if it implies 
restrictions on the right to move and to reside, come under Article 21 TFEU, does not 
mean that all violations of the fundamental rights of persons who have moved to another 
Member State and thus have already exercised their free movement rights constitute 
restrictions caught by Article 21 and secondary law.38 Control by the ECJ thus continues 
to depend on a fundamental right (such as freedom of residence,39 the right to family life40 
or the right to a name41) being read in combination with a national measure that affects 
in an appreciable manner a free movement right, rather than assessing the fundamental 
right standing alone.42
It is sometimes argued that application of a derogation clause which expressly 
grants a margin of discretion to Member States or a right to opt for an alternative 
solution (including as a justification of measures which would otherwise be unlawful 
restrictions) somewhat puts the matter outside the reach of Union law.43 The test should 
once again be whether the Union law clause is sufficiently relevant to be applied and, 
if need be, interpreted in the litigation at hand. I would submit that the outcome in 
Karner, that is, that freedom of expression as a fundamental right was relevant in a case 
concerning the question whether certain selling arrangements (advertising restrictions) 
were a violation of free movement of goods, is to be explained by the fact that the Court 
considered that the so-called Keck principle (that selling arrangements, and according 
37 Case C-60/00, supra note 22, para 39.
38 The ECJ has not adopted in full the approach suggested by one of its Advocates General back in 1992 
(Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis [1993] ECR I-1191, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 9 December 
1992, para 46. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 12 September 2007, para 16, 
in Case C-380/05 Centro Europa [2008] ECR I-349.
39 Case 36/75 Rutili, supra note 18.
40 Case C-60/00 Carpenter, supra note 22.
41 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613. In this case, the matter was not explicitly approached 
as a question of a fundamental right (to a name). Such questions may, however, become human rights 
questions, covered by the right to private and family life recognised in Art 8 of the ECHR, see van Dijk, P., et al. 
(eds.) Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights. 4th edn. Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2006, p. 685.
42 For a recent example of the ECJ denying the applicability of the Charter to a situation not (otherwise) 
covered by Union law see Case C-256/11 Dereci, judgment of 15 November 2011 nyr, paras 71–72.
43 This was, for instance, the argument of some Governments in the Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 
N.S. and M.E., supra note 29.
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to more recent case law, rules regulating the use of products,44 are not always caught 
by the prohibition on restrictions of free movement of goods) does not place the matter 
outside Union law but constitutes a kind of derogatory clause of Union law which was 
applied in the case, including verifying that the conditions for applying the clause (such 
as non-discrimination) were fulfilled.
In N.S., the Court concluded that, whilst Article 3(2) of the so-called Dublin 
Regulation45 granted Member States a discretionary power to depart from the principle 
of a single Member State responsible for the examination of asylum application 
in accordance with a list of criteria, as set out in Article 3(1) and Chapter III of the 
Regulation, this discretionary power ‘forms part of the mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for an asylum application’ provided for under the Regulation 
and a Member State which exercises the discretionary power must thus be considered as 
implementing Union law. The outcome is in accordance with the test presented above, in 
other words that there be a norm of Union law other than the Charter which is applicable 
and directly relevant to the case.46 
I would submit that the test was also applied when in McB, the ECJ considered 
the Charter applicable in view of the fact that the Court had first embarked on an 
interpretation of the so-called Brussels IIbis Regulation47 (ruling that the Regulation 
had to be interpreted as meaning that whether a child’s removal was wrongful for the 
purposes of applying the Regulation was entirely dependent on the existence of rights 
of custody, conferred by national law, in breach of which the removal had taken place) 
and then went on to examine whether any provision of the Charter precluded such an 
interpretation.48
What seems important to underline is that in these situations, a norm of Union law 
other than a Charter provision was considered to be applicable in concreto, and not just 
considered to be of possible relevance in abstracto. In the former case, it is a situation 
of ‘implementing’ Union law, in the second case it is not.49 This is a crucial delimitation 
which also relates to the possible difference between the notions of ‘implementing’ and 
44 Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519, paras 33-37. See also Rosas, A. Life after 
Dassonville and Cassis: Evolution but No Revolution. In: Poiares Maduro, M.; Azoulai, L. (eds.) The Past 
and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 433 at 445−446.
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national, [2003] OJ L50/1.
46 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and M.E., supra note 29, paras 64-69 (citation para 68).
47 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, [2003] OJ L338/1.
48 Case C-400/10 PPU McB, judgment of 5 October 2010 nyr, paras 44 and 51-52.
49 See also von Danwitz, T., supra note 2, p. 1412−1413. The possible relevance of a norm of Union law 
in abstracto may be the situation in Case C-617/10 Fransson pending, where a provision of Council 
Directive 2006/112 of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, [2006] OJ L347/1 is 
cited but does not seem to be directly relevant for the outcome of the case. In his Opinion of 12 June 2012, 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón proposes to declare that the Court is incompetent to give a ruling on the 
interpretation of the Charter.  
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‘scope‘ (or ’field’) of application when it comes to the applicability of the Charter and 
the interpretation of Article 51(1). If ‘scope of application’ refers to applicability of a 
norm of Union law in concreto, in the litigation at hand, the difference more or less 
disappears. If it, on the other hand, refers to a situation which is in one way or another 
covered (also) by a norm of Union law, without any need to apply, and if need be, 
interpret this norm in the actual case at hand, then ‘scope of application’ is a much wider 
notion that ‘implementing’. As it is becoming increasingly difficult to find areas where 
Union law is totally absent,50 the wider approach could easily lead to a situation where 
the Charter is almost always applicable, with the further consequence that the Union 
Courts would become something close to human rights courts with an almost general 
competence to apply fundamental rights. 
In the interest of avoiding this risk, it is preferable, as the ECJ did, for instance, 
in N.S., to use the terminology of Article 51(1) of the Charter rather than that of some 
of the earlier case-law and Article 19(1) TEU (which refers to the ‘fields covered by 
Union law’, ‘scope of application of Union law’, or the like). In some instances, the 
Court (usually by giving an order instead of a judgment) has declined competence by 
observing that a national measure is not connected with Union law. Such formulations 
should probably be seen as more or less synonymous to ‘implementing’, although it is 
true that the Court sometimes, whilst mentioning that the national measures in question 
are not ‘implementing’ Union law, then has added somewhat incongruously that the 
national legislation is not ‘connected in any other way with Union law’ (‘ou present 
d’autres elements de rattachement au droit de l’Union’).51 In some other decisions, the 
Court has declined competence simply by noting that the measures did not constitute 
an implementation of Union law.52 The latter approach, in other words, keeping to the 
wording of Article 51(1) of the Charter, seems the one to be preferred.  
5. EU Fundamental Rights and Human Rights Not Governed by 
the Charter
As was noted above, Article 6(3) TEU confirms the continuing relevance of 
fundamental rights as general principles of Union law. The provision essentially repeats 
a provision that was already included in the TEU by the Treaty of Maastricht. The 
question then arises as to the relation between Article 6(1) TEU, together with the 
50 It should be recalled that especially with the amendments to the Treaties brought about by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, such matters as criminal law and military defence are increasingly affected by Union law. See, 
e.g. Rosas, A.; Armati, L., supra note 2, p. 194−197 (criminal or penal law) and 254−260 (security and 
defence).
51  See, e.g. Case C-27/11 Vinkov, judgment of 7 June 2012 nyr, para 59, and some non-reported orders of the 
ECJ, such as Case C-339/10 Estov, Order of 12 November 2010, para 14; Case C-457/09 Chartry, Order 
of 1 March 2011, para 25; Case C-314/10 Pagnoul, Order of 22 September 2011, para 24.  
52 See, eg Case C-434/11 Corpul National al Politistilor, Order of 14 December 2011, paras 15−16; Case 
C-462/11 Cozman, Order of 14 December 2011, para 15; Joined Cases C-483/11 and C-484/11 Boncea, 
Order of 14 December 2011, para 34.
Allan Rosas. When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Applicable at National Level?1282
Charter, and Article 6(3) and as to the relevance of this question for the question of the 
scope of application of EU fundamental rights independently of the Charter.
In the case law following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECJ has 
focused on the Charter and, if doubts have been raised as to its applicability, Article 
51(1).53 In some instances reference has also been made to fundamental rights as general 
principles of law, which may be explained by the fact that the cases in question covered 
events predating the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and thus of the Charter.54 
Such references will probably become more and more exceptional at the expense of the 
Charter. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that with time passing, the general 
principles of Union law could in the future become relevant as a means of supplementing 
the Charter in accordance with societal change, assuming that the Charter would not 
have been amended in the meantime.
Be that as it may, it seems preferable to maintain a parallelism between the scope 
of application of the Charter and that of general principles of Union law. I would thus 
advocate using the same test and the same terminology (‘implementing’) for the general 
principles as has been recommended above with respect to the Charter and its Article 
51(1). Having a broader (or narrower) scope of application for the general principles as 
compared to the Charter would seem to be a recipe for confusion and legal insecurity.
In any case, and whatever exact formula is used, it is manifest that the applicability 
of the general principles of Union law, including fundamental rights (Article 6(3) TEU), 
requires a nexus between the principle and Union law more generally. Such a nexus 
is less relevant when it comes to the mechanism provided for in Article 7 TEU for 
sanctioning a Member State deemed to be guilty of serious human rights violations. If 
the European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member 
States or by the Commission, has determined the existence of ‘a serious and persistent 
breach’ of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU, the Council, acting by qualified 
majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the 
Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the representative 
of the government of the Member State in the Council.55 The only nexus to Union law 
seems to be the reference to Article 2 TEU and the values enumerated therein (respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities). In other respects, the 
applicability of Article 7 is not limited to national measures implementing Union law 
but the provision may be applied in situations of serious and persistent breaches of 
human rights in general. The provision, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, has 
never been applied in practice.56
53 Rosas, A.; Kaila, H., supra note 2. 
54 See, e.g. Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, supra note 25.
55 This may be preceded by a decision of the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members 
after having obtained the consent of the European Parliament, to determine that there is a ‘clear risk’ of a 
serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2.
56 Sanctions taken by the other Member States against the Austrian government in 2000 were of a purely 
political nature and were not based on Article 7 TEU, Rosas, A.; Armati, L. (2012), supra note 2, p. 168.
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Another context where the application of fundamental rights – or to be more precise 
as regards this particular context, human rights  –  is not specifically contingent upon 
the parallel application of another norm of Union law is provided by the general trade 
and cooperation agreements the EU has concluded with a great number of third States.57 
These agreements normally include a so-called human rights clause, which states in 
very general terms that respect for fundamental rights and democratic principles, as laid 
down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (in a European context, reference 
has also been made to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe instruments), inspire the internal and external policies of the 
parties and constitute an ‘essential element’ of the agreement. Another provision normally 
to be found among the final provisions of the agreement deals with the possibility of taking 
measures in cases of non-execution of the agreement (that is, of any provision of the 
agreement and not just of the human rights clause) by the other side, including suspension 
of the operation of the agreement, and requires each party to consult the other party before 
taking measures, save in cases of special urgency. Also EU legislation relating to financial 
assistance to third States often contains a human rights clause enabling suspension of 
assistance in case of serious human rights violations in the recipient country.58
As has been recognised by the ECJ, an important reason for including the human rights 
clause in agreements with third countries is to spell out the right of the EU (and of the other 
Contracting Party concerned) to suspend the operation of the agreement or to take other 
countermeasures in case of non-respect of the clause.59 The human rights clause thus does 
not seek to transform the basic nature of an agreement otherwise concerned with trade, 
development cooperation, and so on, nor to establish new standards in the international 
protection of human rights. The EU’s approach to these matters is based on the assumption 
that the basic terms of reference for the human rights clause, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, largely reflects general international law on the subject. Its treaty practice, 
accepted by the third countries parties to these agreements, accordingly contributes to the 
reaffirmation of the Universal Declaration as an expression of general international law.60
The human rights clause, which has directly or indirectly triggered a host of EU 
sanctions undertaken against third States (concerning, in most cases, suspension or 
limitation of development cooperation), is not, in itself, limited to situations where 
57 See, eg Brandtner, B.; Rosas, A. Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: 
An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice. European Journal of International Law. 1998, 9: 473−477; 
Hoffmeister, F. Menschenrecths- und Demokratiklauseln in den vertraglichen Aussenbeziehungen der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1998; Bulterman, M. Human Rights in the Treaty 
Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues or Virtual Reality? Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2001; 
Fierro, E. The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2003; Rosas, A. The European Union and Fundamental Rights/Human Rights. In: Krause, C.; Scheinin, M. 
(eds.) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook. Turku/Åbo: Åbo Akademi University 
Institute for Human Rights, 2009, p. 443 at 466−470; Ladenburger, C., supra note 2, p. 172. 
58 See Rosas, A., supra note 57, p. 468−470.
59 See Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR I-6177.
60 See, e.g. European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 1990-1999, adopted by the EU Council in 
October 1999. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 1999, p. 2. See also Rosas, A. (2009), supra note 
11, p. 426−431.
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another norm of Union law is being applied or implemented. The clause is in principle 
binding not only on the EU institutions but also the EU Member States61 and, of course, 
the third States parties to the relevant trade and cooperation agreements. Any human 
rights violations of a serious character may trigger sanctions, including sanctions which 
could be undertaken by the third State party to the agreement (there is no reported case 
of sanctions undertaken against the EU, however).
Concluding Remarks
The main summary and conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that, 
in approaching the question of the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
as well as fundamental rights as general principles of Union law, at the national level, it 
is recommended to:
• take as a point of departure Article 51(1) of the Charter and its reference to the 
implementation of Union law
 
• examine whether there is a norm of Union law other than a provision of the 
Charter which is applicable in concreto – in other words directly relevant for 
the case at hand; the test is not satisfied by the simple fact that it is possible to 
cite a norm of Union law which on substance covers the same subject area as is 
at issue in the actual case.
This ‘pragmatic’ conclusion does not, of course, solve all problems. It has to be 
admitted that it may be seen as containing an element of circular reasoning: to judge 
whether it is a question of implementing Union law, one has to examine whether Union 
law is being implemented.  This does not seem to be an insurmountable problem, 
however. In any case before the Union Courts or national courts, determining at least 
in a preliminary way the applicable law is a normal starting point. If this preliminary 
analysis shows that at least one norm of Union law other than a Charter provision is 
directly relevant, there should be an equally preliminary assessment of whether an 
application of a Charter provision could affect the application (including questions of 
interpretation and validity) of the norm of Union law. These determinations can, of 
course, be reassessed in the course of the proceedings.
It is true that this approach requires a case-by-case analysis in concreto rather 
than simply applying some general and clear criteria. Given the fluidity of the scope 
of application of Union law and the intertwinement between Union law and national 
law, such a case-by-case approach seems not only possible but also necessary. It is, 
in this respect, also recommended to follow a rather strict line in determining whether 
a norm of Union law is directly relevant in a case or not. This is called for not only 
61 According to Article 216(2) TFEU, agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon not only the 
institutions of the Union but also its Member States.
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because of the affirmation, in Article 6(1) TEU and Article 51(2) of the Charter, that the 
Charter is not intended to increase the competences of the Union but also – quite frankly 
speaking – taking into account the increasing work load of the Union Courts, which 
have their hands full with the current – and, it seems, ever increasing – remit of Union 
law and could not simply cope with the task of becoming an additional layer of human 
rights courts in Europe.
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KADA EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS PAGRINDINIŲ TEISIŲ CHARTIJA YRA 
TAIKOMA NACIONALINIU LYGMENIU?
Allan Rosas
Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismas, Liuksemburgas
Santrauka. Europos Sąjungos pagrindinių teisių chartija (toliau – Chartija) nuo 2009 m. 
gruodžio 1 d. tapo Europos Sąjungos (toliau – ES) privalomos pirminės teisės dalimi. Nors 
Chartija kodifikuoja ir aiškina Europos Sąjungoje garantuojamas pagrindines teises, tačiau 
Chartijos taikymas yra gana reikšmingai apribotas. Chartija taikoma tik tuo atveju, kai 
grėsmė kyla ES teisės normoms. Kai valstybių narių nacionaliniai teismai ir kitos institucijos 
susiduria vien tik su nacionalinės teisės problemomis, jos neprivalo taikyti Chartijos nuostatų, 
bet turėtų remtis nacionalinėmis konstitucinėmis normomis, kurios garantuoja pagrindinių 
žmogaus teisių apsaugą, bei tarptautinėmis žmogaus teisių sutartimis, pagal kurias valstybė 
narė yra prisiėmusi įsipareigojimus. Tačiau konkrečiose situacijose ne visada yra paprasta 
atskirti ES ir nacionalinės teisės taikymo sritis. 
Šiame straipsnyje analizuojamos teorinės ir praktinės problemos, kylančios taikant ir 
aiškinant Chartijos 51(1) straipsnį, pagal kurį Chartijos nuostatos yra skirtos valstybėms na-
rėms tik „tais atvejais, kai šios įgyvendina Sąjungos teisę“. Siūloma laikytis pragmatiško po-
žiūrio ir vertinti kiekvieną situaciją atskirai. Todėl turėtų būti analizuojama, ar konkrečioje 
byloje, be Chartijos nuostatų, dar galima taikyti ir kitas ES teisės normas. Jei atsakymas yra 
teigiamas, tai tokioje byloje turėtų būti taikoma ir Chartija, preziumuojant, kad Chartijoje 
įtvirtintos nuostatos gali būti reikšmingos bylos baigčiai. Jei atsakymas yra neigiamas, nacio-
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naliniai teismai ir kitos institucijos turėtų taikyti nacionalinius teisės aktus bei tarptautines 
sutartis, garantuojančias pagrindines žmogaus teises ir laisves.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: pagrindinės teisės, Europos Sąjungos pagrindinių teisių chartija, 
taikymo tikslas, Europos Sąjungos teisė ir nacionalinė teisė, Europos Sąjungos teisės įgyven-
dinimas. 
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